"Who said you can't fight city hall? For more than a decade, the drug barons of the Medellín cartel have been using murder and corruption in an attempt to cow or co-opt elected officials of this pleasant, bustling Colombian city of 2 million people and turn it into the world capital of the cocaine business. In the process, Medellin, known locally as the "city of eternal spring" for its mild mountain climate, has become the city of eternal violence. More than 3,000 people were murdered there last year, a homicide rate about five times as high as New York City's and most likely the world's steepest. In one 18-hour period at the beginning of February, Medellin police reported 13 killings." -- Time Magazine, 1988
Medellín in the 20th Century: Growth, Inequality, and Corruption
Like many other countries across the world, Colombia saw tremendous rural-to-urban migration throughout the second half of the 20th century. In just 60 years, Medellín grew from a city of under 170,000 people to a population of more than 2.3 million. The city did not plan for such unprecedented growth, and was unable to meet demands for housing and public services (Blanco and Kobayashi 2009). Additionally, the lack of available jobs for new residents led to high rates of extreme poverty. Newcomers to the city set up informal housing in the previously unsettled hillsides. As a result of the city’s steep terrain, impoverished communities were geographically isolated, with limited access to critical resources in the urban center including jobs, food, and healthcare.
These conditions made Medellín vulnerable to local drug dealers and, most notably, made it possible for Pablo Escobar's regime to infiltrate the city's economy and government. In addition to engaging in political corruption, Escobar's regime was responsible for tremendous violence in the city, peaking in 1991 with a rate of 381 murders per 100,000 people (Brand 2013). Throughout the last two decades of the 20th century, Medellín earned a reputation as the world's most violent city, as highlighted by the above excerpt from Time Magazine. On top of the violence, policies from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank left the Colombian economy in shambles and Medellín's future in question (2013).
These conditions made Medellín vulnerable to local drug dealers and, most notably, made it possible for Pablo Escobar's regime to infiltrate the city's economy and government. In addition to engaging in political corruption, Escobar's regime was responsible for tremendous violence in the city, peaking in 1991 with a rate of 381 murders per 100,000 people (Brand 2013). Throughout the last two decades of the 20th century, Medellín earned a reputation as the world's most violent city, as highlighted by the above excerpt from Time Magazine. On top of the violence, policies from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank left the Colombian economy in shambles and Medellín's future in question (2013).
Escobar Falls, but Medellín Struggles to Rise
After years of dominating the cocaine trade in Colombia, Pablo Escobar was killed in December 1993. While it is tempting to blame the Escobar drug cartel for all of Medellín's problems and, in turn, trace a linear progress narrative from his death to the city's transformation, this characterization would oversimplify the truth. In fact, following Escobar's death the city continued to experience violence, as many of the informal settlements were taken over by well-armed militias. Simultaneously, Don Berna's network of gangs known as "La Terraza" gained power throughout other parts of the city. The militias were eventually eliminated after the President of Colombia sent national troops to occupy Comuna 13 in 2002. While this opened the informal settlements for Don Berna's gangs to move in, Berna was less interested in mass violence and largely pacified the city's drug trade (Hylton 2007).
Despite continued violence throughout much of this period, there was a push toward change for the informal settlements through the adoption of the Integral Program for the Informal Settlements Improvement of Medellín (PRIMED). PRIMED was adopted in 1993 and run by the Colombian National Government and the Medellín local government in partnership with the German National Government. PRIMED attempted to improve the lives of those in the informal settlements beyond simply upgrading housing, but also through public services and civic engagement. The program was largely successful in its early stages, but was unable to sustain funding and political support, ultimately dissolving in 1996. Though PRIMED was not sustainable, it did serve as a model for Medellín and other cities moving forward (Blanco and Kobayashi 2009).
In 2000, Mayor Luis Perez took office and initiated city-wide reforms, most notably the Metrocable system. The Metrocable is a network of cable cars that makes transportation from the poorest hill areas cheaper and more accessible. Perez supported the project throughout his campaign and agreed to finance the project with city capital investment dollar. Construction began shortly after Perez took office and the first line was operational by 2004 (Da Vila and Brand 2011).
Despite continued violence throughout much of this period, there was a push toward change for the informal settlements through the adoption of the Integral Program for the Informal Settlements Improvement of Medellín (PRIMED). PRIMED was adopted in 1993 and run by the Colombian National Government and the Medellín local government in partnership with the German National Government. PRIMED attempted to improve the lives of those in the informal settlements beyond simply upgrading housing, but also through public services and civic engagement. The program was largely successful in its early stages, but was unable to sustain funding and political support, ultimately dissolving in 1996. Though PRIMED was not sustainable, it did serve as a model for Medellín and other cities moving forward (Blanco and Kobayashi 2009).
In 2000, Mayor Luis Perez took office and initiated city-wide reforms, most notably the Metrocable system. The Metrocable is a network of cable cars that makes transportation from the poorest hill areas cheaper and more accessible. Perez supported the project throughout his campaign and agreed to finance the project with city capital investment dollar. Construction began shortly after Perez took office and the first line was operational by 2004 (Da Vila and Brand 2011).
New Leadership brings change for Medellín
Though it had been over a decade since the death of Pablo Escobar, to many in Medellín it seemed there had been little change until the election of Mayor Sergio Fajardo in 2003. Around the time of Don Berna's pacification of the drug trade, Fajardo campaigned on a promise to reduce violence and rid the city of corruption (Hylton 2007). Throughout Fajardo's campaign, it was evident he believed deeply in the power of Medellín's residents, as he campaigned door-to-door in the poorest communities (Devlin and Chaskel 2010). A trained mathemetician and university professor, Fajardo approached Medellín's problems strategically, but always kept in mind his campaign slogan "only the best for the poorest" (Fink 2013). Additionally, Fajardo's father was an architect, which gave him a unique appreciation for the importance of the built environment. As Fajardo stated in a 2007 Newsweek interview, "People who say that a beautiful building doesn’t improve education don’t understand something critical. The first step toward quality education is the quality of the space. When the poorest kid in Medellín arrives in the best classroom in the city, there is a powerful message of social inclusion" (Beck 2009).
Fajardo wanted his administration to address three broad issues: inequality, violence, and corruption (Fajardo 2011). Importantly, Fajardo did not have a set agenda for how to best address these issues, but instead worked with communities to tailor reform to local needs. Fajardo championed a local reform strategy known as Social Urbanism (Bateman and Duran Ortiz 2011). According to Bateman and Duran Ortiz, Social Urbanism is a form of the "local development state" model where "sub-national levels of government need to be pro-active in building the institutional and organisational infrastructures required for growth-oriented... small and medium enterprises to emerge and to upgrade."
Though Social Urbanism has roots with Mayor Perez, Fajardo's predecessor, it was Fajardo who truly operationalized this approach to reform through his Proyecto Urbano Integral (Integral Urban Project). The PUI, discussed further in the profiles of the Northeast Comunas and Comuna 13, was a key element of Fajardo's plan to make "Medellín: the Most Educated." Through the PUI, Medellín began work on a network of public library parks, improved transportation and infrastructure, and upgraded housing in informal settlements. As a part of the Social Urbanism approach, the PUI is funded through revenue from the city-owned energy company, Empresas Publicas de Medellín (EPM). The EPM is mandated to dedicate 30% of its annual profits toward the city's budget (Bateman and Duran Ortiz). This funding mechanism is critical so that Medellín does not have to rely on corrupt funding sources, the national government, or external donations for the PUI. This form of financing also gives the city flexibility in the allocation of funds, and allowed Fajardo to implement broad social programs such as the Centros de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal (CEDEZO) small business support centers (Bateman and Duran Ortiz 2011).
Due to Colombian law, Fajardo was unable to run for a second term, but Medellín saw great progress during his tenure. He reduced government corruption through increased transparency, evidenced by the fact Medellín tripled the number of organizations with whom the city contracted during his administration (Devlin and Chaskel 2010). Furthermore, schools improved dramatically, and the number of students performing below average on the Colombian national assessment dropped from 65% to just 11% in just four years (Devlin and Chaskel 2010).
Fajardo wanted his administration to address three broad issues: inequality, violence, and corruption (Fajardo 2011). Importantly, Fajardo did not have a set agenda for how to best address these issues, but instead worked with communities to tailor reform to local needs. Fajardo championed a local reform strategy known as Social Urbanism (Bateman and Duran Ortiz 2011). According to Bateman and Duran Ortiz, Social Urbanism is a form of the "local development state" model where "sub-national levels of government need to be pro-active in building the institutional and organisational infrastructures required for growth-oriented... small and medium enterprises to emerge and to upgrade."
Though Social Urbanism has roots with Mayor Perez, Fajardo's predecessor, it was Fajardo who truly operationalized this approach to reform through his Proyecto Urbano Integral (Integral Urban Project). The PUI, discussed further in the profiles of the Northeast Comunas and Comuna 13, was a key element of Fajardo's plan to make "Medellín: the Most Educated." Through the PUI, Medellín began work on a network of public library parks, improved transportation and infrastructure, and upgraded housing in informal settlements. As a part of the Social Urbanism approach, the PUI is funded through revenue from the city-owned energy company, Empresas Publicas de Medellín (EPM). The EPM is mandated to dedicate 30% of its annual profits toward the city's budget (Bateman and Duran Ortiz). This funding mechanism is critical so that Medellín does not have to rely on corrupt funding sources, the national government, or external donations for the PUI. This form of financing also gives the city flexibility in the allocation of funds, and allowed Fajardo to implement broad social programs such as the Centros de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal (CEDEZO) small business support centers (Bateman and Duran Ortiz 2011).
Due to Colombian law, Fajardo was unable to run for a second term, but Medellín saw great progress during his tenure. He reduced government corruption through increased transparency, evidenced by the fact Medellín tripled the number of organizations with whom the city contracted during his administration (Devlin and Chaskel 2010). Furthermore, schools improved dramatically, and the number of students performing below average on the Colombian national assessment dropped from 65% to just 11% in just four years (Devlin and Chaskel 2010).
Medellín after Mayor Fajardo
Though Fajardo designed and implemented many positive reforms for Medellín, he was unable to address every issue facing the city and many projects were incomplete when he left office. Since Fajardo left office, several key projects have been completed, including the Line J Metro, the León de Greiff Park Library, and the Atanasio Girardot Aquatic Complex. The current mayor, Aníbal Gaviria, vocally supports the Social Urbanism philosophy and says the hill communities need to be at the center of all reform in Medellín. However, the city is currently drafting its long-term land management plan, and some scholars are concerned that Gaviria's administration has taken a more paternalistic approach to Social Urbanism (Brand 2013). It will be interesting to see how the land management plan incorporates the interests of historically marginalized communities.
While there is still much work to be done in Medellín, it is important to remember how far the city has come. In 2013, Medellin was named the World's Most Innovative City by the Urban Land Institute in partnership with the Wall Street Journal and Citi Bank. Medellín surpassed Tel Aviv and New York, among other prominent global cities, to receive this honor, marking a dramatic change from Time Magazine's 1988 label of "world's most dangerous city."
While there is still much work to be done in Medellín, it is important to remember how far the city has come. In 2013, Medellin was named the World's Most Innovative City by the Urban Land Institute in partnership with the Wall Street Journal and Citi Bank. Medellín surpassed Tel Aviv and New York, among other prominent global cities, to receive this honor, marking a dramatic change from Time Magazine's 1988 label of "world's most dangerous city."
Reform Through the Eyes of Mayor Sergio Fajardo
In 2011, former Mayor Sergio Fajardo was a guest speaker at the Political Equator III convening at the University of California San Diego. Fajardo spoke on several issues, including the history of Medellín, the reasons he sought elected office, his administration's key initiatives, and his vision for the city moving forward.